ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
by shortening the time of payment:
Cmnber v. Wane, ubi sup. Now, an additional remedy being given to the creditor, is equivalent to shortening the
time of payment, and therefore, by analogy, ought to be considered as an adequate consideration for a binding composition agreement. Nevertheless,ViceChancellor STUART observed, in the
principal case, that he "was not aware
of any authority for saying that an agreement to take 5001. recoverable at law,
for 10001. recoverable in equity, could
be said to be founded upon a sufficient
consideration."
We are not inclined to look with a
favorable eye upon the principle involved
in Cumber v. Wane, whereby the law
takes upon itself to unmake the contracts

of persons perfectly sui juris, not upon
any supposed ground of public policy,
but simply because it considers that the
contractors have not looked sufficiently
closely after their own interests. Still.
less are we inclined to approve of the
system of first establishing a general
principle, and then "frittering it away
with nice distinctions." But so long as
the cases to which we have adverted remain undisturbed, it is exceedingly hard
to reconcile these eases with the opinion
of the Vice-Chancellor in the principal
case, that the fact that a debtor has given
a legal remedy to his equitable creditor
is not a sufficient consideration for a
composition of the debt. - Solicitors'
.Journal.
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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.
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BILLS AND NOTES.

WTaiver of Demand and Protest.-A waiver of presentment and
demand of payment of a negotiable note would imply and include a
waiver of protest and of notice of non-payment, but a waiver of notice
only would not be a waiver of demand. A "waiver of protest" would
imply a waiver of presentment, demand, and notice. The waiver is a
matter between the bolder of the note and the indorser to be charged,
and the agreement must be made between them: Jaccard v. Anderson,
37 Mo.
Usur.-The mere fact that a promissory note, payable in the city of
New York, is made and discounted in the country, and a portion or the
whole of the proceeds paid to the borrower in a draft upon the city, at
the usual price or charge for city drafts, does not render such note
usurious: The Union Bank: of Rochester v. Grego73/, 46 Barb.
Perhaps the note might be held to be usurious if both the place of
payment thereof, and the purchase of the draft, were made the condition of the loan. But where nothing of that kind is shown, and for
aught that appears in the finding of facts, the borrower desired a draft
on the city for his own convenience, if the fact was otherwise it is for
the defendant alleging the usury to prove it: Id.
I From Charles Allen, Es., Reporter, to appear in vol. 11 of his Reports.
2
From C. C. Whittlesey, Esq., Reporter, to appear in 37 Mo. Reps.
3 From Hon. 0. L. Barbour, Reporter, to appear in vol. 46 of his Reports.
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Notarial Certi~flate.-A notarial certificate of presentment, protest
for non-payment, and notice thereof, is properly received as presumptive
evidence of the facts stated therein, where the defendant does not, by
his answer, deny the fact of having received notice, but on the contrary
he admits that he received notice, though not until after the note fell
due: .d.
The statute making such certificate presumptive evidence of the facts
contained therein, unless the defendant shall annex to his plea an affidavit denying the receipt of notice, only applies where no notice has
been received at any time : Id.
COMMON CARRIER.

Connecting Railroads.-Ifan arrangement is made between several
connqpting railroad companies, by which goods to be carried over the
whole route shall be delivered by each to the next succeeding company,
and each company so receiving them shall pay to its predecessor the
amount already due for the carriage, and the- last one collect the whole
from the consignee, a reception of such goods by the 'last company, and
a payment by it of the charges of its predecessors, will not render it
liable for an injury done to the goods before it received them: Darling
v. Boston and Worcester R. R. Co., 11 Allen.
Goods not calledfor.-If a common carrier by water cannot find the
person to whom goods carried by him are consigned, or any person
representing the owner, and thereupon delivers them to a responsible
warehouseman for safe keeping, receiving from him payment of all his
charges, and there are no special facts to show that the warehouseman
undertook to act as bailee of the carrier and pot of the owner or consignee, and the goods are never called for, the carrier is not entitled to
reclaim them from the warehouseman by paying the amount of his
charges: ilamilton v. Nickerson, 11 Allen.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Tax on Dividends due to Non.Redidents.-Thelegislature have nopower"
to pass a statute requiring domestic corporations to reserve and pay into
the treasury of the comnmonwealth a certain portion of all dividends
declared by them on shares of non-resident owners: Oliver v. Washington Mi/s, 11 Allen.
CONTRACT.

W
Non-conjliance by reason of Arrest and Imprisonment.-An arrest,
conviction, and imprisonment for crime will exonerate a workman from
the duty of giving to his employers two weeks' notice before leaving
their service, under a contract by the terms of which he has agreed to
give such notice, or not claim any wages due: IHughes v. Wamsutta
flle4, 11 Allen.
DAMAGES.

Evidence of ijury -in Action for Compensation.-In an action to
-recover damages for a personal injury, thb plaintiff may introduce eiideuce to show the kind and amount of mental and physical labor which
he was accustomed to do before receiving the injury. as compared with
that which he has been able to do since, for the purpose of aiding the
jury to determine what compensation he should receive for his loss of
mental and physical capacity: Ballou v. Farnum and Others, 11 Allen.
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DEBTOR AND

CREDITOR.

Creditors, how aided in Equity.-Where a person, who is insolvent
at the time, transfers his interest in a legacy, for an inadequate consideration, to a party who is aware of his insolvency, the creditors of the
assignor may maintain a suit in equity, to have their debts satisfied out,
Of the interest or fund, beyond the consideration actually paid or agreed
to be paid; even though the transaction was notin fact fraudulent, so
as to authorize the court to set it aside on that ground : Bigelow et al. v.
A 1 rault el al., 46 Barb.
In such a case the assignor, in the absence of any fraudulent design
in making the transfer, may obtain the same relief himself, by showing
that it was made under the pressure of his debts, or other importunate
needs. And, certainly equity should regard with quite as much favor
the claims of his creditors-especially in a case where it appears that
he intended to defraud them by a cheap transfer of his estate: Id.
DEED.

Effect of its Destruction.-When a deed has been delivered, so as to
divest the grantor of the title and vest it in the grantee, the subsequent
destruction of it by the parties will not change the title back to the
grantor, and reinvest him with it: Fonda v. Sage et al., 46 Barb.
Couditions in.-It is well settled that a condition, in a conveyance,
can only be reserved for the benefit of the grantor of the estate, and his
heirs; and that no stranger can take advantage of the breach of a
condition: Id.
Until re-entry by the grantor or his heirs, for the breach of a condition, the estate is not forfeited, but remains in the grantee. Mere
neglect to perform the condition is not sufficient to work a forfeiture : Id.
Nor is a mere verbal refusal by the grantee to perform the condition,
if he is an infant at the time: Id.
Where a deed, or other instrument, is handed over by the maker to
the other party, and retained by the latter, and nothing further is said,
the law presumes that the instrument is made according to the agreement, and that the party to whom it is thus handed over accepts it as a
delivery in fulfilment of the agreement between them: Id.
But it is not every mere handing over and retention, for a greater or
less period of time, which will constitute a full and effectual delivery of
an instrument. If it is taken by the grantee or other party merely for
the purpose of examination, to see whether it is in accordance with the
agreement, it is no delivery unless the party concludes to retain it after
such examination: 1d.
And so, where a party makes a purchase of land, and the agreement
is that the vendor is to convey it to the purchaser by a deed, with some
special provision in it, and a deed is made and handed over to such purchaser, which conveys the land to another person, and the purchaser
receives it without any examination of its contents, understanding and
believing that it is a deed made to him, and which vests the title in him,
and he retains it in that belief, until he discovers that it is not such an
instrument as he was to have, and does not -give him the land he had
purchased, he may return it to the vendor, and require one to be made
in accordance with the agreement: Id.
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EQUITY.

Jirisdiction.-Wherethe complaint alleged that the defendants were
proceeding to acquire the title to land under a destroyed instrument, or
to put themselves in a situation to assail the plaintiff's title to the same
premises through that deed: Reld, that whether the case was to be"
regarded as strictly in the nature of a bill in equity to remove a cloud
upon the title to rear estate, or generally, in the nature of a bill guia
timet, to settle the plaintiff's title to the property, and establish it
securely against all claims which might be brought against it Uy reason
of the destroyed deed, the case was clearly one of equitable cognisance,
and the action might be maintained upon either or both grounds:
Fonda v. Sage et al., 46 Barb.
FAAUD.

Agent when liable for.-A purchaser of chattels, after having sued
the vendor for a breach of warranty in the sale, and been defeated in
the action, may bring an action against the agent by whom the sale was
made, for a fraud practised by him on such sale: Gutchess v. Whiting,
46 Barb.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Divorce obtained in another Stote.-A divorce obtained in Illinois by
a citizen thereof from his wife, for the cause of desertion, upon notice
to her by publication in a newspaper in the manner prescribed by the
statutes of that state, is valid, although she was then living in Massachusetts under an agreement by which, after reciting their separation,
he promised to pay her a certain weekly sum as long as she should
remain single, and although she had no actual notice of his proceedings
for a' divorce and was not in Illinois during the pendency thereof; and
it is not competent for her, in this commonwealth, to offer evidence that
he obtained the decree of divorce there by fraud, and upon facts which
would not entitle him to a divorce here: Rood v. Rood, 11 Allen.
Adultery by Marriagewhen former Rusband is not really dead, though
supposed to be.-A man may be convicted of adultery who in good faith
and in the belief that she is a widow marries and cohabits with a woman
who has left her husband and remained absent from him for more than
seven years together without hearing of him, if in fact her husband is
still living: Comnwnwealth v. Thompson, 11 Allen.
INSURANCE.

Cause of Loss.-A policy of insurance upon a building is an insurance
upon the building as such, and not upon the materials of which it is
composed. If from any defect of construction or overloading the building fall into ruins, and subsequently the materials take fire, the insurer
is not liable for the loss: Nave et al. v. Rome Mutual Insurance Co.,
37 Mo.
INTEREST.

Confl;et of Law.-A corporation, created by the laws of another
state, although forbidden by its charter to take more than six per centuni
interest, may, upon loans made in this state, charge the rate of interest
allowed by our laws. The law of the place where the contract is to be
performed will govern the rate of interest. One state will not enforce
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the usury laws of another state, in respect to contracts made within its
own limits: Bank of Louisville v. Young, 37 Mo.
LIEN.
On Vessel built for the Unite.d ,States.-If a vessel has been built for
the United States for the purpose of being used as a floating light, under,
an agreement to construct and equip her according to certain specifications annexed, and to the satisfaction and approval of an agent of the
United States, and to deliver her in this commonwealth, for a gross sum
to be paid by the United States to the builder after her completion, and
the builder has completed the same, and received the contract price, and
the title to her has vested in the United States, subject to the lien, and
possession has been taken of her by the United States, and the spars
and rigging been put up, and the lanterns put on board and prepared
for use, a lien upon her cannot be enforced in the courts of this commonwealth upon proceedings afterwards commenced, for timber which
has been used in her construction: Briggs & Anotler v. A Light Boat,
11 Allen.
NEGLIGENCE.

Action against Contractors-Receiptof .Money in Settlemet.-One
who is employed by a dealer in lumber to deliver lumber upon an unfinished bridge to sub-contractors who have undertaken to build the wooden
portion thereof may recover damages against the contractors who have
undertaken to build the entire superstructure, for an injury sustained
by him while so delivering lumber, through a defect in the iron-work
of that portion of the bridge which has been completed: Curley v.
Barris & Others, 11 Allen.
If one who has received a personal injury through the negligence of
another signs a paper acknowledging the receipt of a small sum of money
in full for his damages, a subsequent action cannot be maintained to
recover damages for the same injury, unless his signature to the receipt
was procured through mistake or fraud; and if instructions to this effect
are requested, and the jury are simply instructed that if they,are satisfied
that the parties "fairly settled the claim it is sufficient, and the amount
received in the settlement is not material to its validity as a settlement,"
a verdict for the plaintiff will be set aside: Id.
Action for PersonalInjury survives to Adminlstrator. -An action at
law to recover damages for an injury which causes immediate insensibility, and death in fifteen minutes, survives to the administrator of the
estate of the deceased: Bancroft v. Boston and Worcester R. R. Co.,
II Allen.
Ferry Cornpany.-A ferry company, being common carriers of passengers, are bound to furnish reasonably safe and convenient means for
the passage of teams from their boats, appropriate to the nature of their
business, and to exercise the utmost skill in the provision and application of the means so employed; but they are not bound to adopt and
use a new and improved method, because it is safer or better than the
method employed by them, if it is not requisite to the reasonable safety,
or convenience of passengers, and if the expense is excessive; and the
cost of such improved method may be a sufficient reason for their
refusing to adopt it: Barron v. East Boston Ferry Co., 11 Allen.
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In an action against a ferry company to recover damages sustained in
passing from their boat, through, the negligence of the defendants in
failing to provide a safe and sufflicient drop over which to pass, proof of
due -care on the part of the plaintiff, and of the injury, will not raise a
presumption of law that the defendants were negligent, or change the
burden of proof which re-sts upon the plaintiff to prove their negligence;
but the same may be taken into consideration by the jury, and allowed
such weight as they think reasonable, in view of the whole evidence: 1d.
NUISANCE.

lnjunction.-Equity will interfere by injunction in case of a direct,
continuing, and permanent nuisance, without compelling the plaintiff to
resort to repeated actions at law. To authorize this interference, there
must be such an injury as from its nature is not susceptible of an adequate compensation by damages at law, or such as from its continuance
must occasion a constantly recurring grievance, which cannot otherwise
be prevented but by injunction. It is only necessary that a party should
establish his right in an action at law preparatory to obtaining an injunction, where a question of title is involved, or the right itself is doubtful
or uncertain. A purchaser of land may hxve his action for the continuance of a nuisance erected before his purchase was made. The keeping
and st;nding of jacks and stallions within the immediate view of a private
dwelling is a nuisance: Rayden v. Tucker, 87 Mo.
RAILROAD COMPANIES.
Tim.e of Commencement of Responsibility for Freight.-If a heavy
article has been carried by a truckman to the depot of a railroad corporation, and injured while being loaded upon the cars, the riilroad company are liable therefor, if they had accepted and taken charge of the
same; and in such case it is no defence to an action against them, that
the injury resulted in part from the carelessness of the truckman: Merrift v. Old Colony and Newport*Railroad-o., 11 Allen.
Power to exclude improper Persons from the Cars.-The conductor
of a street railway car may exclude 6r expel therefrom a person who, by
reason of intoxication or otherwise, is in such a condition as to render
it reasonably certain that by act or' speech he will become offensive or
annoying to other passengers therein, although he has not committed
any act of offence or annoyance: Vinton, v. Md dlesex Railroad Co.,
11 Allen.
Neyliqence-Damage.-Tn an action for damages against a railroad,
for negligently managing its engines, so that fire was communicated
to the standing grss and crops of the plaintiff, the burden of proof is
upon the plaintiff, to show that the fire was caused by the negligence or
want of care of the defendant. There is no legal presumption of negligence in such cases; it must be shown as a matter of fact: Smith v.
Hannibaland St. Joseph Railroad Co., 37 Mo.
Negligence-Acts of Public Enemy.-Carriersof passengers not being
insurers of their safety, are not responsible where all reasonable care,
skill and diligence, prudence and foresight, have been employed. Th.ey
are not liable for mere accident, or misadventure, any more than for the
act of-God, or the public -enemy, for any sudden convulsion of nature,
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or an unknown: or unforeseen destruction, or an unknowable insufficiency
of some part of the road. In addition to this, there must be some
actual negligence, or want of strict care, diligence, and foresight: Sawyer v. Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad Co., 37 Mo.
In a suit by a passenger on a railroad train for injuries occasioned by
the cars being thrown into a chasm, occasioned by the burning of a
bridge by the public enemy, of which defect in the road the conductor
of the train was prevented from receiving notice by the agents and servants of the road being driven off or overawed by the enemy,-an
instruction confining the issue of negligence to the particular case in the
running of the cars, and telling the jury that "if the train was conducted and managed with as much care and diligence as a very prudent
and careful man would have conducted the same where his own interest
and safety were concerned, taking into consideration all the circumstances
surrounding the case, and that the injury complained of was the result
of mere accident, then the carrier was not liable for the injury," was
improperly refused, as it presented to the jury the principle that the
defendant was not to be held liable for mere accident, in the absence of
any want of that degree of care and prudence which the law requires.
If it were not the negligence of the conductor of the train, or his want
of care and foresight, that was the proximate or remote cause of the accident and injury, the carrier was not liable: Id.
Liability as common carriers.-Goodsdestined for S., a place beyond
Dunkirk, but directed to F. at Dunkirk, were transported by the defendant, upon its railroad, from Buffalo to Dunkirk. On the day of
their arrival at the latter place, the goods were called for by the carrier
who was to carry them from Dunkirk to S. The defendant, owing to
other engagements of its agents, was not ready to make the delivery
when called for; and it was mutually agreed, for the convenience of
both parties, that the goods should remain in the defendaut's warehouse,
where they were, until the next morning. During the night the warehouse took fire, by accident, and the goods were consumed. Held that
the liability of the defendant as a common carrier, continued until the
property should be actually delivered to the next carrier: Fenner v.
The Buffalo and State Line Railroad Company, 46 Barb.
RE cOD.
Cannot be impeached.-The truth of a magistrate's record of a criminal
case within his jurisdiction and determined by him cannot be impeached,
even in an action against him for fraudulently and corruptly altering the
complaint and warrant after the warrant had been served: Kelley v.
Dresser, 11 Allen.
TELEGRAPH COMPANY.

Contracts limiting liability.-Telegraph companies, whether regarded
as common carriers or bailees, may specially limit their liabilities, subject
to the qualification that they will not be protected from the consequences
of gross carelessness. A telegraph company may reasonably require
that, for the purpose of avoiding errors, the message shall be repeated,
or that the company shall not be liable for any error in the transmission
of the message: Wann v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 37 Mo.

